Volume 38

Issue 2

Article 16

February 1932

Trusts--Exercise by Trustee of Power to Terminate After Period of
Good Behavior by Spendthrift
Henry P. Snyder
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Henry P. Snyder, Trusts--Exercise by Trustee of Power to Terminate After Period of Good Behavior by
Spendthrift, 38 W. Va. L. Rev. (1932).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol38/iss2/16

This Recent Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Snyder: Trusts--Exercise by Trustee of Power to Terminate After Period of

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
business in that particular locality. The court in applying this
realistic approach to the facts of the case in hand found that the
danger of a prejudicial monopoly in the ice business is largely
averted by two prevalent conditions, namely: (1) the ease with
which ice can be, and frequently is shipped long distances and (2)
-the introduction of domestic refrigeration plants. Thus the proteetion sought for is furnished naturally, without the aid of such
a statute." A similar approach was made in another recent
case."
Undoubtedly, there are those who have different ideas as to
the wisdom of invalidating a statute rigidly controlling the manufacture and sale of ice. Still their quarrel here would be with
the conclusion reached by the court, while from a broad viewpoint the judicial approach to a general problem is more significant than a decision in a single case.
-E. GAUJoT BIAS.

TRusTs

-

EXERCISE BY TRusTEE OF POWER TO TERmI[ATE

A r
PERIOD OF GOOD BEHAVIOR BY SPENDTHRIFT. The St.
Louis Union Trust Company was named trustee for Vincent
Kerens under the will of Kerens' father. The trust created was
terminable in two ways: by Vincent's death or by satisfactory
proof to the Trust Company "that he shall of his own free will
and desire have passed five consecutive years of continued
sobriety and good behavior". The Trust Company determined
that Kerens was entitled to the corpus of the trust in 1928, after
his fifth application to have this trust terminated. To insure its
-position it filed a bill for instructions in the Federal District
Court for Eastern Missouri, naming Kerens and his sisters, the
remaindermen under the trust, as nominal defendants. The sisters appealed from the decision of the District Court affirming
the position taken by the Trust Company. The Circuit Court of
Appeals found from the evidence in the case that the Trust Company knew that Kerens had falsely sworn to an affidavit made in
2OSouthwest Utilities Ice Co. v. Liebman, supra n. 4, at 353. " .....
there-is both potential and actual competition in such business to afford
adequate -protection......
With such competition existing in the business,
we seriously doubt that the manufacture of ice is so affected." .....
(as
to warrant such regulation).
"Consumers' Light & Power Co. v. Phipps, 251 Pac. 63 (Okla. 1926).
See also Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U. S.
418, 447, 47 S. Ct. 426 (1927).
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support of his fourth application during the period of probation
covered by his fifth application. It also found that the Trust
Company had not investigated certain charges, made by Kerensi
divorced wife in the divorce proceedings in Texas, to the effect
that Kerens had lived with another woman for a year and a half
while establishing a residence in Texas for the divorce, which
conduct would also have fallen within the period of probation
covered by the fifth application. Consequently the case was reversed, the court deciding that the action of the Trust Company
was arbitrary on the evidence and that Kerens had not so complied with the trust provisions as to warrant the termination of
the trust in his favor by the Trust Company. Colket v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co.'
At the death of his father when the trust was established
Kerens made an effort to break it by a suit to "construe the
will"2 Clearly Kerens father intended to protect W with a
spendthrift trust; and this the court recognized.' Yet the father
also intended to attempt to reform his son by this trust.' The
trust device terminable on the condition of the reformation of the
cestui has been employed elsewhere.' These trusts necessarily involve the discretion of the trustee as to just when the cestui is
entitled to the corpus.
The discretion left with a trustee may not be arbitrarily exercised but honest judgment is required.' It is said that the discretion will not be interfered with, however, unless it is exercised
for improper motives, or unreasonably, or is not exercised at all
when there is a duty on the trustee.' It is also said that a court will
not deprive a trustee of an honest exercise of the discretion that the
maker of the trust has vested in him.' Still a Massachusetts court
has ruled that an honest exercise of discretion in good faith is
not enough, but there must also be the use of reasonable prudence
and sound judgment in reaching the decision to terminate the
152
F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 8th 1931).
2

Kerens v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 283 Mo. 601, 223 S. W. 645, 11 A.
L. R. 288 (1920).
OSupra n. 2, at 283 Mo. 615.

supra n. 3.
'Markham v. Hufford, 123 Mich. 505, 82 N. W. 222, 48 L. R. A. 580
(1900); Ordway v. Gardner, 107 Wis. 78, 82 N. W. 696 (1900).
'2 PRR.Y ON TRUSTS (7th ed. Baldes, 1929) § 511.
7Morton
v. Southgate, 28 Me. 41 (1848); Bacon v. Bacon, 55 Vt. 243
(1882); Jones' Estate, 12 Pa. Dis. Rep. 113 (1898); Stein v. State Deposit
& Trust Co., 127 Md. 206, 96 Atl. 349 (1915); Viall v. Rhode Island Trust
Co., 45 R. I. 432, 123 Atl. 570, 32 A. L. R. 437 (1924).
48 Mason v. Jones, 3 Edw. Ch. 497 (N. Y. 1842); Sharon v. Simons, 30 Vt

458 (1857); Ireland v. Ireland, 89 N. Y. 321 (1881).
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trust." And no matter how absolute the discretion given by the
maker of the trust may be, it is not sufficient to deprive equity
of jurisdiction to supervise the discretionY It seems that the
Circuit Court properly ruled on the present case.
But the trust in the principal case is rather unique in that
a corporation is executing a trust which involves a determination
of the propriety of personal conduct of the cestui. The reported
cases in which this has been considered are practically nil. In
Roberts v. Corson" a corporation held property in trust to use as
it determined the personal needs of its members, but the court
discusses the case on the charitable trust basis. Then in Viall V.
Rhode Island Trust Co.,' a corporate trustee was given power to
terminate a trust when it decided that the cestui was competent
to handle the property but no question of the reformation of the
cestui arose there.
The unusual and novel exploitation of the trust device in the
principal case constitutes the chief interest in the case. And such
a trust imposes on a corporate Trust Company a great fiduciary
responsibility; the possibilities for fraud and collusion between
trustee and cestui are quite apparent. Yet with the ordinary impersonal attitude of a Trust Company and its usually efficient
administration of estates, such a trust is not likely to become the
subject of abuse. There appear to be grounds for preferring the
corporate trustee to the individual for the execution of such a
trust device.
P. SNYDER.
-ENRY
9

Corkey v. Dorsey, 223 Mass. 97, 111 N. E. 795 (1916)'.
.Angell v. Angell, 28 R. I. 592, 68 Atl. 583 (1908); Keating v. Keating,
182 Iowa 1076, 165 N. W. 74 (1916).
1179 N. H. 215, 107 At!. 625 (1919).
1'

Supra n. 7.
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